Homo absconditus

Identity is a commonplace complexity.

In our everyday lives, we are pressured to identify with political parties, professions, and products. Republican or democrat? Artist? Accountant? Engineer? Apple or PC?

There are innumerable factors with which we can (and do, whether or not we want to) align ourselves in order to signify to our social context just where we fit. Even by opting out, you are taking a stance, and signifying at least some little part of your identity.

The social sciences similarly recognize the importance of identity, exploring how it operates in our individual lives, communities, and societies. At base, something like social identity theory reveals that identity is primarily a question of categorization: I am me because I am not you. I am part of this in-group and not that out-group. In this, the internal motivation for self-understanding is married to the external motivation for effective socialization.

Identity development, however intentional or authentic, is nevertheless a primarily social process.

The nature of identity in the binary (in-group versus out-group, 1s or 0s) proffered by social identity theory already reveals a primary pitfall of identity per se: it reduces any aspects that are not consistent with the in-group or out-group to better fit that category. In this, we have a basic understanding of prejudice. It is the treatment of others based on a preconceived opinion of them as the out-group. This is our default, it is how we understand ourselves, and it is indeed prejudice.

Our need for identity and reliance on social context cultivates conflict.

So, our drive for identity inhibits understanding of others. Moreover, in pressing ourselves into an in-group, we may similarly reduce ourselves. Anyone who has experienced the eerie feeling of considering a purchase that is then seen recommended on social media or a webpage banner knows this all too well. Because you are interested in Apple, you may be interested in a Chemex. An innocuous suggestion, perhaps, but has genuine interest been hijacked by well-placed advertising? Probably.

There are of course markers of identity beyond such material and external factors, though even virtues, beliefs, and principles are at least influenced by upbringing and social context. They are further statements of behavior relative to others. For example, modesty if not requires at least implies the braggart. It is primarily a statement of relative behaviors distinguishing one from another. Even if everyone were to become increasingly virtuous, some would still be less virtuous than others, and this A≠B formulation of identity would be maintained.

In every action or inaction, belief, aversion, and preference, we are signifying something about ourselves. Nature or nurture, organic or constructed, however arbitrary or intentional, these signifiers of identity are inputs imbued with meaning. And, whether we intend to or not, we interpret every input.

Processing any sensory data requires translating it: perception is interpretation. Take visual input, for example, and the object stimulating the visual perception. The visual input actuates neuronal firing that engenders an experience (“seeing”) of the object. This is inevitably interpreted in the process of becoming conscious (seeing a “chair”). Our default is to interpret the experience, and this occurs without regard for our desire.

In this example of the chair, it is not difficult to understand the essence of the chair in seeing it, even if you are only seeing it from one perspective. The signifier and signified, visual input and object, are identical. In the case of identity, however, it is not easy to understand the essence of a person in seeing them. The signifier (whatever it is we are claiming represents us, whether political party, virtuous characteristic, or product) is necessarily distinct from the signified (“I,” the self beneath signification).

I suspect few people would claim any one identity summarizes them. Athlete, writer, partner, whatever, we fail to cleanly inhabit an identity because we are specifically not one identity. The self is not just the mediator of these different social roles, but the essence of them. Each formation of identity is but a perspective of that self. Moreover, any one identity is a static event, a freezing of the dynamic self beneath, and we tend to keep the first impression we have of someone, whether or not it is accurate and whether or not they change. The human psyche, however, is not a static phenomenon.

In interpreting markers of identity, we invariably reduce ourselves and others. However intentional we strive to be, identity is inherently divisive. Our very method of understanding ourselves and others as beings in the world precludes understanding of ourselves and others.

Identity is inevitably obscuring.

Much like mindfulness for most of us ends up being thinking about not thinking, perhaps identity could operate the same way. In mindfulness, we suspend judgment of our observed experience in order to rewire our mental habits. In mindful relationships, familiar or not, perhaps we can suspend identification of ourselves and others in order to rewire our social habits.

This will open us to the signified self, instead of just the signifier covering that self. This will open us to genuine encounter, seeing who we are, when and where we are. This will open us to being surprised in interactions.

There is wonder in our world, in our communities, and in ourselves if we pause to look. Instead of prompting prejudice, perhaps identity can be a process of becoming, and genuine encounter the only signification we seek.